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nomic factors at play behind the switch from home bias to Euro bias. We find that decline
in default risk and transaction cost are two key determinants of the rise in portfolio Euro
bias. The second part of the paper goes deeper into the effects of Euro bias on Euro area
bond and equity markets. We observe that both government and corporate bond markets
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1 Introduction
In the 1990s, a financial phenomenon that puzzled economists is why investors hold so much
of their wealth in domestic equity rather than investing in an internationally diversified port-
folio. Since the benefits of international diversification are well-known,1 it therefore appeared
as puzzling when French and Poterba (1991) observed very high domestic ownership of shares
in the world’s five largest stock markets: the United State (92.2%), Japan (95.7%), the United
Kingdom (92%), Germany (79%) and France (89.4%). Since then, a large number of academic
papers have been written explaining the portfolio home bias puzzle – see Lewis (1999) and
Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for excellent surveys of the home bias literature.2
In recent years, however, portfolio home bias has notably decreased. For instance, measuring
portfolio home bias on a 0 to 1 scale, where 1 equals complete home bias and 0 equals no home
bias, Sørensen et al. (2007) demonstrated that, from 1993 to 2003, average debt (equity) home
bias in 24 OECD countries declined from 0.63 (0.83) to 0.52 (0.67). Particularly in the Euro
area, debt home bias declined for all countries; while, with the exception of Greece, equity home
bias declined for all Euro countries. Figures 1 and 5 of the present paper, respectively, provide
visual evidence of rising foreign debt and equity holdings to GDP ratio for all Euro member
countries.
Although portfolio home bias has declined among the Euro countries, a deeper inspection
of the geographical patterns of international portfolio holdings reveal that Euro countries have
been disproportionately investing in Euro originated assets over the assets originated from non-
Euro countries. In other words, Euro investors have shown a strong preference for intra-Euro
portfolios than international portfolios. This anomaly has in turn gave rise to a new bias, which
now is known as portfolio Euro bias.3 Figures 2 and 6 confirm this assertion. Contributions of
Euro debt and equity in Euro members’ foreign portfolios have risen quite remarkably over the
past years.
Answers to the questions of why the switch from home bias to Euro bias and what economic
factors contributed to this switch are related to each other. In the past, foreign portfolio
investment was considered risky because seldom investors had required information on foreign
1Grubel (1968) first pointed out that international diversification can improve mean-variance trade-off com-
pared to holding a purely domestic portfolio.
2Various explanations for the home bias puzzle have been offered in the literature. For a summary of these
explanations, see Foad (2008).
3Lane (2005) first introduced the concept of portfolio Euro bias. Recently, Giofre´ (2008) and Balli (2009)
provide further evidence for portfolio Euro bias.
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portfolios. With the launch of the Euro in 1999, the information problem has been significantly
lessened. Besides the information asymmetry, the pace of foreign portfolio investment was often
thwarted by numerous other classical factors such as exchange rate risk, interest rate risk or
inflation risk. With the introduction of the common currency in 1999, these obstacles became
obsolete overnight.4 The notion of psychological barriers to international diversification that
once prevailed among investors had disappeared, and money started to travel across borders
more rapidly than ever before (see, among others, Adjaoute´ et al. (2000) and De Santis (2006)).
One of the purposes for the creation of the Euro zone was the promotion of large and
liquid Euro bond and equity markets that could increase the availability of liquid instruments
to Euro zone investors. Indeed, the integration in European financial markets has brought a
surge in cross-border trading. For example, competition among Euro area governments has
led to increasing liquidity of government securities and larger volumes of outstanding issues.
Likewise, the Euro area has witnessed an unprecedented boom of corporate bond issuance.
Furthermore, the arrival of the Euro had a significant (negative) impact on the underwriting
fees of international corporate bonds issued in the new currency.5 In the equity markets, the
total number of initial public offerings (IPOs) and their volume surpassed that of the U.S. and
Japan for the first time during 1999-2000,6 although the trend partly reversed in 2001 and 2002
in the midst of a global decrease both in volume and number of IPOs (Hartman et al., 2003).
These developments have led to a reduction in home bias as investors were eager to benefit from
the improved diversification and liquidity within the Euro area.
The transition from the decline in portfolio home bias to the rise in portfolio Euro bias
has not gone unnoticed in the literature. Adjaoute´ et al. (2000) provided one of the earliest
assessments of the Euro area’s securities market. Unsurprisingly, the authors noticed that the
disappearance of currency risk in itself had not completely eliminated the existing home bias,
but they acknowledged that the range of initiatives taken by European policy makers would
foster future intra-Euro investments. Adam et al. (2002) and Baele et al. (2004) conducted
very detailed and systematic analysis of the state and evolution of financial integration in the
Euro area. In particular, they devised a methodological framework to study the level of financial
4Of course, these barriers were mechanical and disappeared immediately with the advent of the single currency.
Other obstacles such as transaction costs, credit risk and so forth can slow down the process of cross-border
investments in the Euro area. We will get back to this issue later in the paper.
5See Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) for the impact of the Euro on the underwriting market for corporate bonds
denominated in the new currency.
6At the end of 1999, Euro area stock market capitalization stood at US$ 5,526 billion, the second largest after
the U.S. (US$ 16,773 billion) but ahead of Japan (US$ 4,445 billion) – see Kraus (2001) for further information.
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integration in five key Euro area markets: money, corporate bond, government bond, credit and
equity markets. One of the findings of Baele et al. (2004) is that the bond markets achieved
a very high degree of integration, indicating a reduction in the home bias of bond portfolios
(both government and corporate bonds) in the Euro area. Similar reduction in equity home
bias in the Euro area has also been observed, albeit to a lesser extent. Similar to Sørensen et
al. (2007), Foad (2008) observes very sharp drop in intra-Euro equity holdings, with home bias
falling from 68% to 29% between the pre -and post-Euro periods. Both Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007) and Giofre´ (2008) document the equity Euro bias phenomenon; for the former, the trade
channel seems to drive the equity Euro bias, while the latter finds evidence of the financial
channel shaping Euro countries’ equity portfolios after integration.
Our objectives in this paper are to empirically analyze the relevant economic factors at
play behind the switch from home bias to Euro bias over the periods 1997 and 2001-2007. In
so doing, we run bilateral panel regressions comprising 24 OECD countries using a number of
variables that are often used in the literature in analyzing the spatial pattern of international
portfolio holdings.7 Next, we examine the implications of rising intra-Euro area investment
holdings separately on Euro bond markets and on Euro equity markets. A particular feature of
this segment of the analysis is the use of more recent observations (i.e. 1997-2009), which allow
us to examine the impact of the recent financial turmoil on the Euro area’s financial markets.
We wanted to find out in what ways Euro area bond and equity markets have evolved following
the transition from home bias to Euro bias.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Consistent with the theoretical predic-
tions, the empirical results show that transaction costs, market capitalization and relative credit
default risk play decisive roles in the determination of cross-border asset holdings. We find that
within the 24 OECD countries, investors reveal a preference for investing in the Euro bond mar-
kets, as indicated by the statistically significant coefficient of the Euro area dummy variable.
Expectedly, Euro area investors show a tendency of investing in Euro equity markets with lower
transaction costs. Consistent with earlier studies, we also observe a remarkable convergence in
government bond yields in the Euro area during the 2001-2007 period. However, we have also
noticed a partial breakdown of the convergence process following the financial crisis of 2008-
7International portfolio flows have skyrocketed in the last fifteen years and a large number of studies have tried
to explain their determinants. See De Santis (2006) for a list of related papers. Chan et al. (2005) conducted an
empirical analysis on the determinants of domestic bias and foreign bias across different countries from all over
the world.
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2009. Likewise, the corporate bond markets have also shown clear signs of strain during the
recent financial turmoil. Finally, our results also reveal that the risk-reduction potential from
geographic diversification within the Euro equity market is lower than that of the Euro sector
diversification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a two-asset portfolio model
explaining international bond holdings issued by two different markets. Section 3 describes
the data-set, while Section 4 discusses the main empirical findings. Section 5 evaluates the
implication of rising Euro bias on Euro bond and equity markets. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Foreign Portfolio Model
The basic default risk and transaction cost models of Lewis (1999) and Bernoth et al. (2004)
have been modified to the context of international bond markets.8 Suppose a domestic investor
decides to invest his wealth in both domestic and foreign bonds. He will hold foreign bonds as
a proportion of his wealth:
Ft = θAt, (1)
where Ft and At denote the amount of foreign bond holdings and domestic investor’s total wealth
at time t, respectively; and θ  [0, 1]. The remaining wealth is invested in the domestic bonds,
Dt:
Dt = (1− θ)At. (2)
Domestic investor maximizes his utility according to the expected return and the variance of
the portfolio return:
Max U = [E(At + 1), V ar(At + 1)]. (3)
Because investor’s utility increases in response to an increase in expected wealth at t + 1 and
decreases with respect to the variance of the expected wealth; the first derivative of the utility
8Equities do not enter in the foreign portfolio model. A formal model with cross-border investment in equities
is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
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function, U1, is assumed to be positive, while the second derivative, U2, is generally considered
to be negative. For simplicity, we assume that relative to the domestic bonds, foreign bonds are
subject to lesser or negligible default risk. However, in the empirical analysis we consider the
default risk differential between the domestic and foreign countries as a potential determinant
of cross-border asset holdings.
Let P (xt) denote the probability that the return on the domestic debt will be paid in full as
expected. Here, xt includes a set of variables affecting the probability. In the case of a default,
the investor receives a fraction of his gross payment, τ  [0, 1 + r) where r is the interest rate
paid on domestic bonds. Thus, at time t, either the domestic investor is paid in full:
P (x)× (1 + r)(1− θ)At, (4)
or the investor receives a fraction of the domestic investment:
(1− P (x))× τ(1− θ)At. (5)
Investor incurs transaction costs proportional to his investment in bonds which in turn nega-
tively affect the liquidity of the bond market. The transaction cost, respectively, for domestic
and foreign bond holdings, γd and γf , is a proportion of outstanding bond value. At t + 1,
domestic investor’s expected wealth is:
E(At+1) = [P (xt)(1 + r)(1− θ)At + (1− P (xt))(1− θ)Atτ ] (6)
−(1− θ)Atγd + θ(1 + r∗)At − θAtγf ,
where an asterisk denotes foreign variable. The variance of the investor’s wealth is:
V ar(At + 1) = [P (xt)× (1− P (xt))(1− θ)2(1 + r − τ)2]A2t . (7)
Domestic investor maximizes his utility subject to the optimal foreign bond holding. The F.O.C
is:
∂U
∂θ
=
∂U
∂E(At+1)
∂E(At+1)
∂θ
+
∂U
∂V ar(At+1)
∂V ar(At+1)
∂θ
= 0. (8)
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Domestic investor’s optimal share of foreign bond holding is given by:
θ =
[(1− P (xt))(1 + r − τ) + (γd − γf ) + (r∗ − r)]φ
P (xt)(1− P (xt))(1 + r − τ)2 , (9)
where
φ = − ∂U
∂E(At+1)
× ∂V ar(At+1)
∂U2At
.
According to Equation (9), the domestic investor is reluctant to hold foreign assets as long as the
transaction costs plus the return differential between foreign and domestic bonds outweigh the
default risk probability of the domestic bonds, i.e. [1−P (x)(1+r−τ)+(γd−γf )+(r∗−r)] < 0.
Nonetheless, our model assumes that the domestic investor holds foreign bonds, suggesting that
the net return on foreign bonds (cost adjusted) exceeds that of the net return on domestic
bonds. As we shall see, the data seems to support this claim. By comparison, domestic investor
will be reluctant to hold foreign bonds involving higher issuing costs or lower return, despite
their lower default risks.
Equation (9) also states that the optimal share of foreign portfolio is affected by various
fundamental factors, such as default risk, transaction costs, return differential, and the level of
relative risk aversion of the domestic investor. The effect of default risk on the share of foreign
portfolio holdings is given as:
∂θ
∂τ
=
(P (xt)− 1)[(P (xt)(1− P (xt))(1 + r − τ)2) + 2G]φ
[P (xt)(1− P (xt))(1 + r − τ)2]2 < 0, (10)
where
G = ((P (xt)(1− P (xt))(1 + r − τ)2)× [(P (xt)− 1)τ + (1− P (xt))(1 + r) + (γd − γf ) + (r∗ − r)].
Thus, a higher default risk in the domestic market will lead domestic investors to hold more
foreign bonds. Likewise, the effect of transaction cost on foreign bond holding is determined
by:
∂θ
∂γf
=
−φ
P (xt)(1− P (xt))(1 + r − τ)2 < 0. (11)
The transaction costs are the cost of intermediation of placing new bonds and are commonly
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measured as the sum of management fee, marketing costs, syndicate fees, and selling concessions
divided by the issue size. As these costs soar, domestic investor lowers his holding of foreign
bonds. By comparison, bond return differential between domestic and foreign bonds may not
be a good indicator of θ given the remarkable convergence of bond yields across the Euro area.
Consequently, we make use of some bilateral factors such as GDP growth correlation, distance,
to capture the return differentials between domestic and foreign bonds.
Finally, the relative risk aversion of the domestic investor may be relevant for cross-border
asset holding. We could not directly measure the risk aversion of the domestic investor, but
make use of some proxy variables to account for the risk aversion. This includes the ratio of
volume of lower graded bonds (junk bonds) to all bonds issued in the domestic country or the
volume of junk bonds issued and traded in the domestic market.9
2.1 Linking Theory to Empirical Strategy
To empirically analyze the main determinants of the cross-border asset holdings for international
portfolio investment, we employed the following reduced form of the above-mentioned two-asset,
two-country portfolio model. The reduced form model is given as:
θict = α
i + αc + β∗0Debt
i−c
t + β
∗
1TRANS
ic
t + β
∗
2LIQ
ic
t + β
∗
3EMU + β
∗
4X
i
t + 
i
t, (12)
where the dependent variable θic is the share a of foreign country’s (c) bond/equity in the
total volume of the home country’s (i) foreign bond/equity portfolio. Coefficients αi and αc
correspond to the fixed effects element of the home and foreign country, respectively. Several al-
ternative measures are considered as proxies for the country-specific fixed effects. In particular,
for the foreign country’s fixed effects, these measures include the factor market capitalization
rate, real PPP adjusted GDP per capita and the log linearized population. For brevity, only the
statistically significant variables are presented in this paper. Debti−ct is the debt-to-GDP ratio
differentials between the home and foreign country. It provides an overall measure of the finan-
cial leverage of an economy. It also provides information concerning the general government’s
quality as a borrower, which affects the composition of default risk of the corporate bonds.
Since investors are particularly interested in the borrowers’ ability to pay back their debts, the
inclusion of a measure of fiscal indebtedness is crucial in explaining the pattern of external
9Junk bonds are defined as bonds that are rated as CCC or lower by credit rating institutions.
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portfolio holdings. TRANSc is the aggregate primary market transaction costs of bond/equity
in the foreign markets.10 It is constructed by taking weighted averages of the gross spread of
each bond/equity issued in each foreign market. LIQc is the liquidity, marketability or trading
costs of bonds. It is now well established in the literature that transactions costs in the sec-
ondary asset markets inhibit the frequency of trading. In general, less liquid bonds are traded
less frequently, realize lower prices, and exhibit higher yield spreads. EMUc is a binary dummy
variable equal to 1 if the foreign country is a member of the EMU; zero otherwise. Finally,
Xt is a vector of bilateral factors that are often used to capture the informational content of
cross-border asset trading. Some bilateral variables include, as often used in the literature,11
GDP growth correlations and stock market return correlations. Theoretically, allocations that
are driven by a diversification motive should be reflected in a negative sign on these correlation
variables. Distance among financial markets can impact direct as well as indirect (informa-
tion related) transaction costs. As a result, we also include distances between capital cities of
domestic and foreign markets as a regressor to capture information flows.
3 Data
Our data come from a number of sources. The data comprise information about foreign portfolio
investment for 24 high income OECD countries.12 We obtained pair-wise volumes of cross-
border asset holdings in U.S. dollars from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys
(CPIS) for the years 1997 and 2001–2007. Portfolio investment is broken down between equity
and debt, with information on the residence of the issuer and the destination of the investment.
The CPIS is the most comprehensive and unique survey of bilateral portfolio investment holdings
currently available.
Information on market capitalization of bond markets is taken from Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) quarterly review. The size of a country’s total bond market capitalization
is measured as outstanding domestic debt securities minus outstanding short-term (less than
one year remaining to maturity) domestic securities plus outstanding international bonds and
notes. Total market capitalization of equity markets is obtained from the World Development
10Further discussion on the costs of cross-border investment in the context of Euro area can be found in
Adjaoute´ et al. (2000).
11See, for example, Baele et al. (2004) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
12These include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Indicator issued by the World Bank. The data for the total debt and government deficit levels
of each country are obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Primary transaction costs (gross spread costs) for bonds and equities are taken from the
Thompson Deals SDC Platinum database. The gross spreads of bonds are collected from
straight/fixed-rate corporate bonds issued by industrial firms. Gross bond and equity spreads
of financial or monetary institutions are excluded from the sample to avoid understatement of
asset’s issuing costs due to their close association with the underwriters. After excluding these
observations, our sample comprises 16,124 non-equity linked fixed-rate corporate bonds issued
by non-financial corporations. In addition, we exclude 114 observations that did not contain
the total value of issued bonds and an additional 13 observations with gross spreads higher than
30%. Likewise, after a similar data cleansing, we have 25,133 observations of equities issued by
non-financial firms.
The secondary market transaction cost or liquidity measure is constructed using the method
developed by Chen et al. (2007), which extends the Lesmond et al. (1999) methodology to a two-
factor model. The two factors (interest rate and equity market return) are included to capture
the fact that a corporate bond is a hybrid between a risk-free bond and equity. Essentially,
the Chen et al. (2007) liquidity measure involves regressing the desired (or true) bond return
for bond j on the two factors. As the desired bond return is unobserved, following Amihud
and Mendelson (1986), the desired return and the measured return are linked together after
taking liquidity costs (both buy-side and sell-side costs) into account. The effect of liquidity
on bond prices is then modeled by combining the main regression equation with the liquidity
constraint – see Chen et al. (2007) for further discussion. We obtained daily bond spreads
and bond characteristics from Datastream for each corporate bond issued in the Euro region
plus Danish, Swedish and UK bond markets.13 Bonds which are neither rated by S&P500 nor
Moody’s were also included in the calculations. We separated the corporate bond data-set for
bond years in order to calculate the liquidity premia for each year and market. Daily bonds
were checked in detail for omission and data errors. For a given bond year, if the return of the
bond was zero for more than 70 percent of the whole year observations, then that observation
was eliminated for the entire bond year. In addition, we omitted daily prices of the given
bond that were ±50 percent of the prior day’s price. Both that day’s price and also the prior
day’s price were eliminated. After the necessary data cleansing, we had reliable information on
13Finland and Iceland were excluded from the analysis due to lack of data.
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liquidity premiums for 1305 non-callable, non-equity linked corporate bonds issued and traded
over 1997–2007.14
Daily return of 18 leading sector indices have been constructed from the Dow Jones STOXX
dataset.15 This comprises a total of 300 equities issued among Euro members and spans from
1995 to 2007 to capture the effect of the start of monetary union on equity markets. Other
variables that are employed to determine bilateral cross-border asset holdings are distance in
kilometers, equity market correlations and GDP growth rate correlations. Distances in kilome-
ters between two countries’ capital cities are taken from UK’s airport accommodation website.16
Equity market correlations of different countries are calculated based on the daily stock market
price data taken from Datastream and Morgan Stanley Capital International.
4 Estimation Results
Tables 1–6 present pairwise estimates of bilateral portfolio bond and equity holdings between
home and foreign countries. In all cases, the dependent variable is the share of the foreign
country’s assets (bond or equity) in the home country’s total portfolio investment. Let us begin
with Table 1 where the OECD represents both the home and the foreign countries. We can see
that the host country’s share of world market capitalization (FMCc) stands as a significant factor
behind domestic investors’ decisions to hold foreign bonds in their portfolios. In general, coun-
tries with higher market capitalization tend to have more liquid markets, leading to a common
understanding of better earning potential of the investments. Unsurprisingly, transaction costs
negatively affect home investors’ desire to hold foreign bond assets. When the return differential
between home and foreign bonds is narrowing, surely home investors care more about the costs
of holding foreign financial assets. The significantly negative estimate of TRANSACTIONCOSTc
confirms this point. Interestingly, the coefficient of the dummy variable EMUc is significantly
positive, reflecting OECD investors’ bias towards holding Euro originated bonds. This result
provides a preliminary support to our research question that the materialization of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU) has led the member countries to shift from portfolio home bias
14Sometimes, there are mismatches between the market where a security is issued and where the security is
traded. There are some corporate bonds that are issued, for example, in market A but traded in market B.
Datastream filters these bonds; therefore we did not have the problem of identifying corporate bonds with their
original markets.
15The Euro Zone STOXX covers Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
16http://www.airport-accommodation.co.uk/worlddistances.php
11
to portfolio Euro bias. The coefficient of debt-to-GDP differential (DEBTi−c) is positive and
significant at the 5% level under the broader specification, suggesting that a higher domestic
debt-to-GDP ratio increases domestic investors’ holding of foreign assets. Both distance and
output correlation are reported as not statistically significant.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]
Table 2 displays the results for non-EMU home investors holding bonds in the EMU markets.
Higher transaction costs (primary and secondary) in EMU financial markets act as a barrier to
investment by non-EMU investors.17 This result is consistent with the stylized consumption-
based asset-pricing model which implies that investment in foreign countries can bring diversifi-
cation benefits but may be discouraged by the transaction costs. Consistent with the theoretical
predictions, the coefficients of market capitalization and the debt-to-GDP ratio differential turn
out to be positive and significant. Neither distance nor GDP correlation turn out to be indi-
vidually significant.
Tables 3 and 4 seem to echo earlier findings. In Table 3, where the EMU represents both
home and foreign countries, the significantly positive coefficient of DEBTi−c suggests that in-
vestors differentiate between government bonds across Euro area countries in terms of liquidity
and credit risk. In other words, investors seem to take into account the relative fiscal positions
of Euro area governments when pricing bonds issued by these entities. Since fiscal vulnerability
differs across member countries, investors from high default risk countries (e.g. Spain) may
benefit from diversifying their bond portfolios in low default risk countries (e.g. France). Bond
investors are likely to reward those countries that have followed more prudent fiscal policies
by offering improved financing conditions (ECB, 2003).18 This point is further reinforced by
the significantly positive coefficient of the Euro bond bias dummy variable (EMUc) in Table 4,
which shows domestic investors’ inclination towards EMU originated bonds over international
bonds. This result, in agreement with previous findings, suggests that the key factors behind
the Euro bond bias are the lower transaction costs and the lower default risk premium. In
order to satisfy the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact, the EMU members
achieved a sharp decrease in total debt/GDP ratios, leading to a decline in default risk in those
markets. In addition, due to the competition among the underwriters and investment banking
17Recall that TRANSACTIONCOSTc (LIQUIDITYPREMIUMc) measures transaction costs associated with primary
(secondary) financial markets.
18Indeed, the recent sharp widening of the yield of Greece’s 10-year sovereign bond relative to Germany is a
clear reflection of the sorry state of Greece’s public finances.
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houses, the gross spreads in the Euro area decreased considerably. Consequently, a domestic
investor does not need to seek any other securities, when those in EMU markets are issued and
traded cheaper, and contain less default risk.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here]
Tables 5 and 6 display estimates of similar regressions, but instead, we concentrate on the
pairwise cross-border equity holdings. As before, market capitalization and transaction costs
remain the significant determinants of cross-border equity holdings. Interestingly, unlike bond
investment, the positive and statistically insignificant coefficient of the EMUc dummy variable
shows domestic investors’ weak preference for the EMU originated equities over international
equities. However, the coefficient of the interaction variable – the EMU dummy multiplied
by the transaction costs – is significantly negative, suggesting that when a local Euro investor
wants to invest inside the Euro area, they choose assets from markets that have lower issuing
costs. This result also supports our previous findings that primary market transaction costs
are important in explaining the Euro equity bias. In most cases, the output correlation coef-
ficient is significantly positive, indicating that business cycle synchronization between OECD
countries is an equally important determinant of cross-border equity portfolio flows. Finally,
Table 6 presents the results for non-EMU home versus OECD host countries. The results are
quite different. First and foremost, transaction costs do not appear to be a significant factor for
non-EMU investors investing in equities across the OECD area, contrary to what was observed
for EMU investors (see Table 5). This difference in result is possibly due to differences in in-
vestors’ motives for holding equity assets. In the case of non-EMU investors investing in OECD
equities, the investments appear to be motivated by diversification objectives, as evident by the
negative coefficient of GDPCORRELATION, whereas it is driven by non-diversification gains for the
EMU investors, as the coefficient of GDPCORRELATION is significantly positive. Expectedly, the
coefficient of the interaction effect between the EMU dummy and transaction costs is negative,
suggesting that non-EMU investors tend to hold lower equity assets from EMU markets where
the primary cost of equity investment is higher. However, this effect is not statistically signifi-
cant. Quite surprisingly, non-EMU investors show a negative bias towards EMU-based equities,
as indicated by the significantly negative coefficient of EMUc. The incidence of “negative EMU
bias” is quite puzzling and we leave this issue for future research.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
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In summary, consistent with the theoretical predictions, the results show that transaction
costs, market capitalization and relative fiscal indebtness play important roles in the determina-
tion of cross-border asset holdings. In contrast, bilateral variables do not appear to significantly
explain the design of an optimal portfolio.
5 Financial Integration and the Rise in Euro Bias
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, we examine the implications of increased
financial integration on the Euro area bond (government and corporate) markets. The second
part focuses on the impact of financial integration on the Euro area’s equity markets.
5.1 The Rise of Euro Bond Bias
With the introduction of the Euro, there has been a considerable change in Euro area bond
(government and corporate) markets. As Figure 1 shows, the ratio of foreign debt holdings to
GDP in each Euro country rose significantly over the last few years. This, in turn, has resulted
in an increase in volume of bond trading with each other, which is evident from the increase in
the Euro share of Euro members’ foreign debt holdings (see Figure 2). This is likely to indicate
that the reduction in the home bias in bond portfolios was largely restricted to the Euro area
only, suggesting that bond market integration has increased to a much greater extent between
the various Euro area markets than between world bond markets.19
Increasing financial integration has had a dramatic impact on the Euro area government
bond markets, which is the main source of financing for central and local governments within
the area. For example, yields spread between 10-year government bonds, relative to Germany,20
across most Euro area countries declined sharply. Adjaoute´ and Danthine (2003) attribute this
strong convergence of government bond yields to a similarly strong convergence in underlying
fundamentals such as elimination of exchange rate risk, convergence in economic policies in-
cluding monetary polices and the restrictions on fiscal policies as outlined in the Stability and
Growth Pact. In addition to the strong compression in yield spreads, dispersion in yield for
10-year government bonds relative to Germany has also declined. For instance, Adjaoute´ and
19This is consistent with the finding of Baele et al. (2004) who observed that from 1998 to 2003, the share of
non-Europe bond funds remained more or less constant at around 20 percent, while the share of Europe-wide
bond funds saw a more than three-fold increase (from less than 20 percent to over 60 percent).
20In the absence of yield in a perfectly integrated market, the 10-year German government bond yields are
considered as a second-best alternative in the literature.
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Danthine (2003) noticed a more than 90 percent fall in the cross-sectional dispersion of yields
from pre-Euro period to the post-Euro period.
To get an understanding of the impact of financial integration on bond yield spreads across
the Euro area countries, following Baele et al. (2004), we estimate the following regression:
∆RFit = αit + βit ×∆RFger,t + εit, (13)
where RFit represents the yield on a 10-year government bond in country i at time t, while
RFger is the yield on a 10-year German benchmark bond, αit is the time-varying intercept, βit
is the time-varying slope coefficient with respect to yield changes in the German benchmark
bond, ∆ is the difference operator, and εit is the country-specific shock. The coefficient β is a
direct measure of the speed of convergence in the overall market.21 Thus, when β converges to
unity, markets appear to be more integrated. With a complete or high degree of integration,
bond yields should react only to news common to all markets, since purely local risk factors are
assumed to diversified away by investing in bonds in different regions (Baele et al., 2004). The
same process works in reverse when β approaches zero.
Equation (13) is estimated using bond yields over the 1997-2009 period. Figure 3 reports the
evolution of the estimated beta coefficients over time. As can be seen, the betas varied across
countries until 1999, after which they converged considerably.22 Greece was an exception due to
its later integration into the monetary union; however, once Greece joined the Euro in 2001, its
beta quickly reached the a close to one. Approximately, over the 2001-2007 period, the evidence
from Figure 3 suggests that local bond yields were increasingly driven by common news, and
considerably less affected by idiosyncratic local news. One critical aspect of the Euro sovereign
bond yields convergence was that Germany’s interest rate did not rise to meet the rates of
the member countries halfway; rather, interest rates of the member countries converged toward
the rates of Germany.23 This resulting underpricing of sovereign default risk during the recent
credit boom gave several Euro member countries easy access to longer-term borrowing. Thus,
despite their high debt-to-GDP ratios, the PIIGS24 countries were able to borrow at a (lower)
cost similar to countries with comparatively better fiscal positions (e.g. Germany). Particularly
21The is the so-called beta convergence widely used in economic growth literature. See Adam et al. (2002) for
further discussion.
22Increase in both the supply of liquidity and the risk appetite by international investors during the post-Euro
period can be attributed to the remarkable convergence of EMU government bond spreads after 2001.
23We are grateful to Stephen L. Jen for bringing this point to our attention.
24PIIGS: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain.
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among the PIIGS countries, Greece’s situation is quite unique.25 Greece has a long history of
fiscal trouble. Greece, as noted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), spent more than half the years
since 1800 in default. Although some degree of budgetary discipline and debt stabilization was
achieved in the run-up to Euro membership, once safely inside the Euro, Greece relaxed its
fiscal grip. Even months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (shielded by Euro membership),
Greece was able to borrow easily, if not as cheaply as before the financial crisis.26 Nonetheless,
years of spending splurge, accumulation of the debt mountain and the problem of misreporting
of statistics by the Greek authorities eventually led Greece into the sovereign-debt crunch.
Naturally, these local developments have weakened the convergence process of Euro area
sovereign spreads vis-a`-vis the German benchmark in the most recent years. As evident from
Figure 3, the estimates of beta coefficients have drifted away from unity – particularly for the
PIIGS countries – during the economic and financial crisis of 2008-2009. Not surprisingly, the
extent of divergence has been largest for Greece compared to other PIIGS countries, which is
clearly consistent with Greece’s recent debt crisis. These results clearly signal how the evolution
of local risk factors may create problems in the (full) integration of the government bond market.
Our results are in line with the ECB (2009), which also observes the recent tendencies towards
market segmentation for government bond market based on both price-based and quantity-based
indicators.27
[Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here]
Compared with the government bond market, the European corporate bond market is rela-
tively young and considerably smaller than those of the United States and Japan. Nevertheless,
as reported by Baele et al. (2004), since 1998, the volume and value of corporate bonds (both
A-rated and BBB-rated segments) increased substantially. For example, from 1998 to 2003,
the value of the A-rated segment bond increased from e 30 billion to e 220 billion, whereas
the value of the BBB-rated segment increased from e 3 to more than e 182 during the same
period. Much of the increase in lower-rated bonds was due to the increased participation of
non-financial corporations. From the demand side, the combination of an ageing population,
25Despite the similarities in fiscal vulnerabilities among PIIGS countries, no other country shares them all to
the same degree as Greece (Portugal comes closest). As noted by Rossi and Aguilera (2010), foreign claims on
Greece amount to $302.6 billion, of which $106.8 billion is claimed on the public sector. At 31.6% of GDP, this
is over twice as large as the average of the other PIIGS (15.1%).
26“Greece’s sovereign-debt crunch: A very European crisis”, The Economist, February 4, 2010.
27See Balli (2009) for further discussion on the state of financial market integration across Euro area government
bond markets.
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large unfunded pension liabilities and the reduction in government bond yields, as well as the
decline in the level of government bond debt, led investors to turn to long-term fixed income
corporate bonds (Baele et al., 2004). Figure 4 plots return differences between different rated
corporate bonds relative to a benchmark government bond yield. Not surprisingly, the yield
difference is higher for A− rated bond vis-a`-vis the AAA rated bonds. This is because higher
rated bonds have a lower credit spread compared with the lower rated bonds.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
As before, we can measure the extent of corporate bond market integration by utilizing
a similar empirical analysis where yield spread on a corporate bond is regressed on a bench-
mark government yield to capture the component that is common to all corporate bonds. The
regression is specified as:
∆Rit = αit + βit∆Rf t + βsMFI + εit, (14)
where ∆Rit is the daily percentage change in yield of each corporate bond and ∆Rf t is the
daily percentage change in the Euro-wide 10-year government bond yield, which is measured by
taking the weighted average of the government bond yields in the region. The dummy variable
MFI is included to isolate corporate bonds issued by financial or monetary corporations, which
are expected to comove strongly with the government bonds. Corporate bonds are categorized
according to their credit ratings and regressions are done for each category.28
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Similar to government bond yields, Equation (14) is estimated using bond yields over the
1997-2009 period. Table 7 provides the estimates of betas for the entire Euro corporate bond
market. The result indicates that changes in the higher-rated bond yields (such as AAA) are
significantly explained (and at a greater magnitude) by the variations in the Euro wide long-term
government bond yields relative to A− rated corporate bonds. As the default risk on corporate
bond decreases (i.e. the credit ratings of the bonds increases), beta coefficients move closer to
1. Furthermore, beta coefficients gradually move toward 1 as time passes, particularly over the
1997-2006 period. The gradual convergence states that higher credit rated bonds do not reflect
28We do not consider bonds below A rating, as their number were limited at the beginning of the monetary
union.
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the idiosyncratic properties of the bonds or the market they issued, since they are converging to
government bond returns regardless of the wide range of fiscally vulnerable markets. However,
similar to the government bond markets, the corporate bond markets have also shown clear
signs of strain during the recent financial turmoil. This is indicated by the reduction of beta
coefficients (or lack of convergence) over the 2007-2009 period for all segments of corporate
bonds. The positive and significant estimates of the dummy variable across three categories
of corporate bonds emphasize the point that bonds issued by private financial or monetary
corporations strongly comove with their government counterparts. This strong comovement of
yields between corporate and government bonds suggests that the return risks of the corporate
bond are mostly hedged with the government bond returns.
5.2 The Rise of Euro Equity Bias
Similar to the Euro government and corporate bond markets, Euro area equity markets have
recorded considerable growth over the past decade. Figures 5-6 (analogous to Figures 1-2)
provide evidence of the rise in Euro equity bias over the 1997-2007 period. Compared to the
foreign debt holding to GDP ratio, the share of foreign equity to GDP ratio has been modest
– see Figure 5. Interestingly, similar to the case with debt assets, Belgium, Ireland and the
Netherlands appear to be more aggressive than other Euro members in holding foreign equity
assets as a percentage of their GDP. Figure 6 shows that much of the cross-border equity
investments happened within the member countries, reflecting Euro investors’ preference of
holding Euro originated equities over equities originated from other OECD or emerging markets.
[Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here]
The degree of equity market integration can be analyzed from several angles. One segment
of the literature analyzes whether portfolios should be allocated across countries or across
industries.29 While several earlier papers30 did not find empirical support in favor of industry
factors, more recent papers have found that industry effects are becoming more important. For
example, both Baca et al. (2000) and Cavaglia et al. (2000) show that industry-specific factors
have become more important than country effects in explaining international return variation
toward the late 1990s. However, Brooks and Del Negro (2004) show that part of the increase
in the dominance of industry over country effects may be due to the technology bubble of the
29See Baele et al. (2004) for a brief review of the related literature.
30See, for example, Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995) and Griffin and Karolyi (1998).
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late 1990s. Notwithstanding, Brooks and Del Negro (2004) observe greater integration across
European stock markets after 1998 as a consequence of the start of EMU and the increasing
harmonization of government policies in Western Europe. In particular, for the European
sample excluding the TMBT sectors,31 Brooks and Del Negro (2004) find that industry effects
have become significantly more important than country effects. This finding is in contrast to
the traditional top-down approach of portfolio investments, whereby portfolio managers first
select the countries in which to invest and then choose the best securities in each market.32
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
To analyze the degree of equity market integration in the Euro area markets, we have followed
the literature and computed the cross-country and cross-sector correlations over time.33 The
correlations are calculated as:
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(ηijωij)
2
, i 6= j (15)
where ηij is the correlation between two sectoral indices i and j, and ωij is the weight of the
two indices in the total value of the equities outstanding in Euro region. Figure 7 presents
the weighted average of time-varying correlations of pairwise national indices and sector indices
within the Euro area over the 1996-2009 period. As can be seen, with the exception of 2004,
both the national and sectoral index correlations increased over the 2001-2009 period. One
possible explanation for the rise in cross-correlations during the post-Euro period could be due
to the decline in home bias in the portfolio holdings of investors. As a result, for example, the
marginal investor in German equities may no longer be German, so that country-specific investor
sentiment now plays a smaller role in national equity markets (Brooks and Del Negro, 2004).
Another likely explanation is that firms may have become more diversified across countries in
their sales and financing. Thus, companies around the Euro area may have been more exposed to
the Euro business cycle, causing national stock markets to move together more (Brooks and Del
Negro, 2004). In other words, the increase in correlations during 2001-2009 period (barring 2004)
31The TMBT sectors include telecommunications, media, biotechnology, and information technology.
32Adjaoute´ and Danthine (2003) also find that the potential of diversifying across sectors increased considerably
at the end of the 1990s.
33The Euro sector index comprises 18 important sectoral indices developed by Dow Jones STOXX. The Euro
600 STOXX sector index contains 12 Euro members and the global 600 index includes 15 EU countries and
higher income OECD members. The countries included in the global index are: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
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may have been caused by the cycle rather than structural changes in the underlying economy
and/or financial system.34 Notably, the European equity markets show no sizeable reduction
in their degree of integration since the financial turmoil unfolded in the second half of 2007.
Interestingly, over nearly the entire sample, country correlations have been higher than sector
correlations, implying that the risk-reduction potential from geographic diversification within
the EMU is lower than that of sector diversification. This result is consistent with that of the
ECB (2009),35 which found that since 2001, the benefits of diversification through sector-based
equity investment strategies has increased relative to those obtained through country-based
ones.36
6 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper is to empirically analyze the transition from the reduction in
home bias to the rise in Euro bias as a consequence of the introduction of Euro in 1999. With
this objective in mind, we analyze factors at play behind the switch from home bias to Euro
bias. All in all, we argue that the rise in Euro bias is, to a large extent, explained by a similarly
strong convergence in underlying fundamentals such as the elimination of exchange rate risk,
convergence in economic policies (particularly monetary policies) and the restrictions on fiscal
policies as outlined in the Stability and Growth Pact.
Based on our main empirical analysis, we find that (lower) transaction cost is the leading
factor for the attractiveness of bond investment in the Euro area. The substantial decline
in bond underwriting costs as well as the reduction in sovereign debt positions of the federal
governments led local investors to diversify their debt portfolio mainly within the Euro markets.
The results are almost similar for the Euro area equity markets. We also analyze the degree of
34The industrially specialized EMU members have potential to experience asymmetric national output shocks
even though the recent literature has foreseen capital market integration and Euro bias as a reason for syn-
chronization of Euro area markets with the United States. Anderton et al. (2004) argue that global economic
integration and international linkages have actually resulted in a greater degree of synchronization of international
activities at a global level between the Euro area and the United States.
35See ECB (2009) for the impact of the financial turmoil on the degree of financial integration in the Euro
area.
36Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) show that greater economic integration among the high income OECD countries,
in particular the Euro countries, resulted in higher specialization in production through better cross-country
income insurance. As a result, the Euro area financial market has become more independent, although the effect
of specialization has been more pronounced in the equity markets relative to corporate bond markets. This is
primarily due to the concentration of Euro corporate bonds in a limited number of sectors. In addition, higher
specialization in production has led to “strong” production sectors in the entire Euro area, with firms located in
different countries exhibiting similar output fluctuations. Therefore, the sectors are seen to have formed clusters.
These clusters are dubbed “super-sectors” by Kraus (2001), who argued that the sectoral indices are the leading
force for stock market returns.
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market integration in the three key Euro area markets: government bond, corporate bond and
equity markets. Consistent with earlier studies, we also observe a remarkable convergence in
government bond yields in the Euro area during the 2001-2007 period. However, we have also
noticed a partial breakdown of the convergence process following the financial crisis of 2008-
2009. Likewise, the corporate bond markets have also shown clear signs of strain during the
recent financial turmoil. Finally, our results also reveal that the risk-reduction potential from
geographic diversification within the Euro equity market is lower than that of the Euro sector
diversification.
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Table 1: Determinants of bilateral portfolio bond holdings: OECD source countries
Home: OECD Home: OECD Home: OECD
Foreign: OECD Foreign: OECD Foreign: OECD
FMCc 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(2.75) (2.91) (2.43)
DEBTi−c 0.33∗∗ 0.56∗∗
(2.17) (2.09)
TRANSACTIONCOSTc −2.18∗∗ −2.17∗∗
(−2.13) (−2.48)
EMUc 1.05∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 3.13∗∗∗
(4.56) (3.12) (3.48)
DISTANCE −0.46 −0.34 −0.62
(−1.01) (−0.81) (−0.64)
GDPCORRELATION 0.72 0.48 0.84
(1.54) (1.52) (1.60)
SAMPLE 462 462 462
ADJUSTED R SQUARE 0.30 0.38 0.41
Notes: Panel regressions are done for country by country bond holdings. Home refers
to the classification of the domestic country. Foreign refers to the classification of the
country issuing the foreign asset. For example, when we have “Home: EMU, For-
eign: non-EMU” this limits the sample to country pairs in which the home country
is an EMU member while the foreign country is taken from the sample of non-EMU.
Annual data is used for years 1997, 2001–2007. OECD includes Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Ice-
land, Japan, Korea Republic, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. The dependent variable is the share of foreign
country (c)’s bond in the total volume of home country (i)’s foreign bond portfo-
lios. FMCc is defined as the foreign country’s share of world market capitalization.
DEBT
i−c is the total debt to GDP ratio differentials between home and foreign country.
TRANSACTIONCOST
c are the expenses in the process of issuing the corporate bonds in
the foreign country. The details of this variable is given in the text. DISTANCE is loga-
rithm of the distance in miles between the capital cities of home and foreign country.
EMU
c is a dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign country is a member of EMU, zero
elsewhere. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are given in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Determinants of bilateral portfolio bond holdings: Non-EMU OECD source countries
Home: non-EMU Home: non-EMU Home: non-EMU Home: non-EMU
Foreign: EMU Foreign: EMU Foreign: EMU Foreign: EMU
FMCc 0.24∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(2.11) (2.20) (2.15) (2.42)
DEBTi−c 0.41∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗
(2.17) (2.75) (2.04)
TRANSACTIONCOSTc −1.11∗∗∗ −1.16∗∗
(−2.48) (−2.08)
LIQUIDITYPREMIUMc −1.51∗∗ −1.60∗∗ −1.31∗∗
(−2.09) (−2.41) (−2.47)
DISTANCE −0.06 −0.09 −0.11 −0.09
(−0.61) (−0.91) (−1.20) (−1.61)
GDPCORRELATION 0.41 0.44 0.72 0.28
(1.17) (1.11) (1.30) (1.65)
SAMPLE 273 273 273 273
ADJUSTED R SQUARE 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.45
Notes: See Table 1. LIQUIDITYPREMIUMc is the liquidity premium of each bond market which is constructed
by taking weighted averages of corporate bonds liquidity premia. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are
given in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Determinants of bilateral portfolio bond holdings: EMU source countries
H: EMU H: EMU H: EMU H: EMU H: EMU
F: EMU F: EMU F: EMU F: EMU F: EMU
FMCc 0.28∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(6.43) (5.44) (5.11) (4.13) (3.05)
DEBTi−c 2.45∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ 3.5∗∗∗
(5.21) (3.21) (4.15)
TRANSACTIONCOSTc −1.16∗∗ −0.89∗∗ −0.98∗∗∗
(−2.18) (−2.28) (−2.62)
LIQUIDITYPREMIUMc −0.29∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗
(−3.44) (−3.18) (−4.12)
DISTANCE 0.04 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.41
(1.03) (0.89) (0.78) (1.24) (1.32)
GDPCORRELATION −0.46 −0.31 −0.26 −0.42 −0.54
(−1.63) (−1.62) (−1.51) (−1.26) (−1.61)
SAMPLE 110 110 110 110 110
ADJUSTED R SQUARE 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.48
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are given in
parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table 4: Determinants of bilateral portfolio bond holdings: EMU source countries
Home: EMU Home: EMU Home: EMU Home: EMU
Foreign: OECD Foreign: OECD Foreign: OECD Foreign: OECD
FMCc 0.26∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(4.12) (4.44) (4.08) (3.13)
DEBTi−c 0.26∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(2..78) (2.88) (3.12)
TRANSACTIONCOSTc −0.38∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗
(−2.90) (−2.78) (−3.09)
EMUc 1.33∗∗∗ 1.31 0.81∗
(3.11) (1.53) (1.70)
DISTANCE 0.11 0.21 0.24 −0.14
(0.45) (0.56) (0.42) (−0.14)
GDPCORRELATION 0.55 0.22 0.34 0.52
(0.43) (1.54) (1.11) (0.43)
SAMPLE 231 231 231 231
ADJUSTED R SQUARE 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.43
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are given in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Determinants of bilateral portfolio equity holdings: EMU source countries
H: EMU H: EMU H: EMU H: EMU
F: OECD F: OECD F: OECD F: OECD
FMCc 0.27∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(12.23) (12.14) (8.45) (8.14)
TRANSACTIONCOSTc −0.57∗∗ −0.59∗∗ −0.62
(−2.05) (−2.16) (1.38)
EMUc −0.12 0.17 1.22
(−1.13) (1.34) (1.54)
EMUc × TRANSACTIONCOSTc −0.35∗∗ −0.62∗∗
(−2.12) (−2.30)
DISTANCE 0.41 0.13 −0.15 −0.21
(0.25) (0.46) (−0.51) (−1.34)
GDPCORRELATION 0.23∗∗ 0.54 0.62∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(2.15) (1.31) (2.42) (2.41)
SAMPLE 198 198 198 198
ADJUSTED R SQUARE 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.44
Notes: See Table 1. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are given in paren-
thesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 6: Determinants of bilateral portfolio equity holdings: Non-EMU OECD source countries
H: non-EMU H: non-EMU H: non-EMU H: non-EMU
F: OECD F: OECD F: OECD F: OECD
FMCc 0.41∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(10.14) (10.12) (6.33) (9.21)
TRANSACTIONCOSTc −0.22 −0.28 −0.26
(−0.43) (−1.31) (−1.46)
EMUc −2.13∗∗ −1.65∗∗ −1.67∗∗
(−2.16) (−2.07) (−2.01)
EMUc × TRANSACTIONCOSTc −0.56
(−1.15)
DISTANCE 0.53 0.22 −0.18∗ 0.46
(1.33) (0.95) (1.85) (0.54)
GDPCORRELATION −0.31 −0.16 −0.42 −0.20
(−0.54) (−0.33) (−0.74) (−0.31)
SAMPLE 228 228 228 228
ADJUSTED R SQUARE 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49
Notes: See Table 1. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are given in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 1: Foreign bond holdings to GDP ratio 
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Source : IMF, CPIS database and OECD national account 
Figure 2: Euro bond bias of EMU members 
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Source: IMF, CPIS database for 1997,  2001-2007. The graph illustrates the Euro share in each 
country's foreign  bond holdings. Euro share=value of  foreign bond holdings held by Euro member 
in Euro area is divided by the total value of foreign bond portfolio held by that country in the world.
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Figure 3: Time-varying betas 
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Source: Datastream and author's calculations. The graph illustrates how much the local 
government bond return is explained by German government bond return.
Figure 4: Euro area corporate bond indices (investment grade): Yield spreads over AAA rated 
government bonds 
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Figure 5: Foreign equity holdings to GDP ratio 
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Source: IMF, CPIS database and OECD National Account Database
Figure 6: Euro equity bias of EMU members 
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Source: IMF, CPIS database for 1997, 2001-2007. The graph illustrates the Euro share  in each 
country's foreign equity holdings. Euro share=value of  foreign equity holdings held by Euro member in 
Euro area is divided by the total value of foreign equity portfolio held by  that country in the world.
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Figure 7: Sectoral and national equity return index correlations in euro area 
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Source: Datastream and Dow Jones Stoxx Database. Indices are calculated by taking weighted 
average of pairwise sectoral or national equity return correlations.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
